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Against Circumspection: Judges, Religious 
Symbols, and Signs of Moral Independence 
 
 





 Issues of symbolic interpretation have emerged as a mainstay of 
the transnational jurisprudence on law and religion.  How should we 
understand the social and legal significance of a crucifix hanging on the 
wall in an Italian classroom?1  What is the meaning and political valence 
of a headscarf, and how does this differ in Turkey2 and France?3  How 
should we interpret the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance,4 
and what is the nature, meaning, and effect—what is the 
phenomenology—of prayer?5  It is this latter question about the nature 
and the communicative effects of prayer that was at the heart of the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Mouvement Laïque v Saguenay.6  
																																																								
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.  Thank you to the contributors 
to this volume, and to my co-editor Richard Moon, for their valuable comments on an 
early version of this chapter.  I am also very grateful to Rachel Devon for her superb 
research assistance. 
1 Lautsi and Others v Italy ECHR 2011-III 2412, 54 EHRR 3. 
2 Leyla Sahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 819, 44 EHRR 5. 
3 See Mayanthi Fernando, ‘Reconfiguring Freedom: Muslim Piety and the Limits of 
Secular Law and Public Discourse in France’ (2010) 37 American Ethnologist 19. 
4 Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow 542 US 1 (2004). 
5 Town of Greece v Galloway 572 US (2014).  On the question of the phenomenology of 
prayer and its intelligibility to law, see Benjamin L Berger, ‘The Legal Unintelligibility of 
Prayer’, https://perma.cc/Q32Y-E5UK. 
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The Court proceeded with notable confidence in finding that an 
individual who did not share the religious beliefs reflected in the prayer 
at issue in Saguenay would experience it as exclusionary, and as an 
affront to state neutrality.  Given the context and the specific prayer at 
issue, perhaps that is so, and perhaps that effect properly dictated the 
outcome in that case.  But apart from the ‘empirical’ question of how this 
prayer would be perceived, there are distinct and important questions 
about how it could and should be interpreted.  Such questions are, I 
suggest, always salient in cases involving religious symbols.  Otherwise 
put, how much are we willing to ask of one another—of politicians, of 
fellow citizens, of judges—by way of interpretive creativity, flexibility, 
and nimbleness when met with the appearance of religion in public life?  
And who ought to bear that interpretive onus?  Given a symbolically 
complicated social world, made so in part owing to religious and cultural 
difference that we seek to support and constitutionally protect, such 
questions seem to be increasingly exigent. 
This chapter takes up these questions surrounding the 
interpretation of religious signs and symbols—and the interpretive 
possibilities that emerge when we demand more from one another in 
thinking about such symbols—by examining the question of judges and 
religious dress in the particular context of the judge’s role as wielding the 
coercive force of the state through the exercise of criminal punishment.  I 
advance the argument that recent debates have proceeded on a 
misleadingly simplistic approach to understanding the meaning of signs 
of religious belonging and identity in this setting and that, with this, we 
miss an opportunity for a deeper understanding of the virtues that we 
hope to find in our public officials.   
In recent years, and consistent with Canadian constitutional 
history, Quebec has been the gravitational centre of debates and 
reflection in Canada about the management of religious difference in a 
religiously diverse society.  Political and legal debates within Quebec 
have tended to raise, with particular clarity, issues that are salient across 
the country.  Two recent happenings in the law and politics of religion in 
Quebec stand out.7   
																																																								
7 There are others, including issues of religious education, an issue that has found its 
way to the Supreme Court of Canada in the form of the cases of SL v Commission scolaire 
des Chênes 2012 SCC 7 and Loyola High School v Québec (Attorney General) 2015 SCC 12.  
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In 2008 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor released their co-
authored report arising from the Consultation Commission on 
Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Difference, the ‘Bouchard-
Taylor Report’.8  The report advocated a model of open secularism, one 
that would navigate the imperatives of regard for religious difference 
and the particularities of Quebec history and culture, through a more or 
less embracing regard for the accommodation of religious practices.  The 
report arose from a sense of public concern about the issue of religious 
difference, concern generated to some extent in response to court 
decisions that had required the accommodation of minority religious 
practices.  In their report, Bouchard and Taylor urged the government to 
prepare a white paper on how to approach the question of religious 
accommodation in Quebec. 
 In 2013 the Parti Québecois (PQ) government took up this 
invitation and placed the ‘Charter of Quebec Values’, or so-called 
‘Charter of Secularism’, on the public table for debate.9  Although it 
proposed a number of amendments and initiatives, Bill 60’s most 
controversial aspect was the prohibition that it would place on public 
employees wearing ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols.  The Bill advanced a 
very different vision of the state relationship to religion than that urged 
in the Bouchard-Taylor report.  Most academic and public commentators 
(including Charles Taylor himself) condemned the Bill’s exclusionary 
and closed vision of secularism, and contested not only the political 
position evident in the Bill, but the internal consistency and rationality of 
the measures that it introduced.  The Parti Québecois gambled and lost 
when they sought to place the fate of this Bill at the heart of a snap 
provincial election, an election that returned a devastating electoral 
																																																																																																																																																					
meetings, in its own way raised questions of state neutrality and the appearance of 
religion in public life, the focus of this chapter and others in this volume. 
8 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation 
(Quebec, Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accomodement reliées aux 
différences culturelles, 2008). 
9 Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality 
between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests, 1st sess, 
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defeat for the PQ, albeit a defeat that does not neatly or stably track 
support for the Bill.10 
 There seems to be a great deal of conceptual distance between the 
Bouchard-Taylor Report and Bill 60.  They assume markedly different 
postures toward the accommodation of religion and the management of 
religious diversity in Quebec.  And yet there are two notable points of 
convergence.  First, both documents assume that the place to begin when 
addressing the issue of the just management of religious difference in 
contemporary society is with a set of claims about the nature and 
demands of ‘the secular’.  In retrospect, one might well read Bouchard 
and Taylor’s emphasis on defining an idea of the secular as a fateful 
move in the road towards Bill 60, one that permitted a denatured, 
simplistic, and abstract claim about what secularism implies to drive a 
vision of religion’s place in Quebec society.  Bouchard and Taylor rooted 
their views and recommendations in an understanding of secularism, as 
did the Parti Québecois when the government advanced a conception of 
laïcité appropriate to Quebec, one that drew heavily from a particular – 
and arguably misleading – understanding of the nature of French 
laïcité.11  Whether one creates more heat than light through seeking to 
deduce just approaches to dealing with religious difference from ideal 
concepts such as secularism is an important question; this episode in 
Quebec feeds my scepticism about this kind of approach.12  Appeals to 
the nature and demands of such broad concepts can draw attention away 
from the complicated social, historical, and political facts associated with 
religious difference in a given society, clearing the way for policy 
prescriptions that—like Bill 60—have regressive and exclusionary effects.   
 Yet this chapter is focused on an issue that arises at a second point 
of convergence between these two moments in the recent history of law 
and religion in Quebec.  Despite the normative space between the 
																																																								
10 Many other factors were at play in the election, including stances taken about Quebec 
sovereignty and the perennially crucial electoral issue—the economy.  
11 Bowen shows that the conventional image of French laïcité is radically misleading in 
its effacing of the rich associational lives that are lived beneath the rhetoric about a 
single republican identity.  See John R Bowen, Can Islam Be French?: Pluralism and 
Pragmatism in a Secularist State (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009). 
12 For a fuller account of my scepticism on this point, see Benjamin L Berger, ‘Belonging 
to Law: Religious Difference, Secularism, and the Conditions of Civic Inclusion’ (2015) 
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Bouchard-Taylor report and Bill 60, and although the Bouchard-Taylor 
report rejected a general prohibition on the wearing of religious symbols 
that would apply to all agents of the state, both agreed that judges—
along with Crown prosecutors, police officers, prison guards, and the 
president and vice-president of the national assembly—should be barred 
from wearing religious ‘signs’.  In the case of Bill 60, this bar on judges 
wearing religious symbols was caught up in the general ban that was the 
focus of so much criticism.  For Bouchard and Taylor, by contrast, these 
figures were distinctively subject to such a prohibition, and this targeted 
prohibition was justified by the particular character of the public duties 
and authority that they exercised.  Bouchard and Taylor explained that in 
the case of other public officials, freedom of religion for these 
individuals, as well as the imperative of equal access to public 
employment, overcame any possible concern that the appearance of 
religious affiliation might signal an absence of state neutrality or some 
form of conflict of interest.  For most public officials, Bouchard and 
Taylor reasoned, we should look to the substance of how their public 
duties are discharged: ‘we must evaluate agents of the State in light of 
their acts.  Do they display impartiality in the performance of their 
duties?  Do their religious beliefs interfere in point of fact with the 
exercising of their professional judgment?’13 
 And yet, for Bouchard and Taylor, the balance came out 
differently in the case of judges, police officers, and prison guards.  
Although they clearly agonised over the decision, Bouchard and Taylor 
ultimately concluded that these individuals should be prohibited from 
wearing religious signs.  The specific justification is of most interest to 
this chapter:  
We suggest that the appearance of impartiality imposes itself at the 
highest level in the cases of judges, police officers and prison 
guards, all of whom possess a power of punishment and even coercion in 
respect of individuals such as defendants, accused person and 
inmates, who are in a position of dependence and vulnerability. 
[Emphasis added.]14 
																																																								
13 Bouchard and Taylor (n 8) 150. 
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Bouchard and Taylor argue that these figures should ‘impose on 
themselves a form of circumspection concerning the expression of their 
religious convictions’,15 a duty that translates into an obligation to not 
wear items that mark their religious identity.  ‘These are positions’, the 
co-commissioners explained, ‘that strikingly exemplify State neutrality 
and whose incumbents exercise a power of coercion.’16   
It is this claim—that there is something about the public function 
of state punishment and coercion that justifies the prohibition on judges 
wearing religious symbols—that I want to explore and interrogate in this 
chapter.  In my view, the ban proposed by both Bill 60 and the Bouchard-
Taylor report fails on some rather straightforward critiques, most clearly 
the exclusion of particular religiously identified people (those for whom 
religious belonging involves outwardly identifiable displays) from key 
roles in the institutions of government.  Prohibiting a person who will 
perform his duties impartially and professionally from being a judge 
because he wears a turban or kippah is not defensible.17  Bouchard and 
Taylor were right to insist on focusing on the substance of one’s conduct 
and treatment of others, rather than leaning on a semiotic analysis of 
signs and symbols in pursuit of an abstract ideal of neutrality as non-
particularity, and this idea should carry through to police officers, 
correctional officers, and judges.   
But my particular interest is in the argument from punishment 
and coercion.  What should we make of this link between expressions of 
religious belonging and the judge’s task of punishing?  More than 
arguing that Bouchard and Taylor’s reasoning on this point is simply 
unconvincing, I will suggest that it might actually be backwards—that 
the argument from the coercive and punishing roles of the judge might 
provocatively point in just the other way.  Might it be that reflection on 
the character of these judicial tasks, and the virtues that we seek in the 
exercise of those functions, should actually lead us to welcome a 
judiciary that reflects and displays its religiously diverse nature?  
The goal of this chapter is to trouble and disrupt the instinct that 
religion and judicial authority are best hermetically sealed from one 
																																																								
15 ibid. 
16 ibid.   
17 See, eg, Jocelyn Maclure’s chapter in this volume for a powerful critique of such bans 
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another, offering an alternative way that we might choose to read 
religious symbols worn by judges.  In this way, this argument should be 
understood, more broadly, as engaged with the set of questions raised at 
the outset of this chapter, questions about the burdens of interpretation 
in a religiously diverse and multicultural society.  In exploring the 
specific issue of how we could and should read the appearance of 
religious symbols on the person of a judge, this chapter thus also gestures 
to this larger theme of the burdens of interpretation in a religiously plural 
society.  Beginning with some scene-setting in the form of a brief 
discussion about the character of sentencing and punishment in Canada 
and why it is a particularly helpful entry point into a discussion about 
the judicial role, this chapter will take a historical excursion into the 
imbrications of punishment, religion, and judgment in the common law 
criminal trial.  Having thus recovered some material that could 
contribute to a different reading or coding of the ‘conspicuous’ religious 
affiliation of judges, I will suggest that there is actually something 
structurally and politically appealing about markers that remind us that, 
in their judgments about the exercise of state power, those who stand 
between the will of a government and the infliction of coercive force on 
individuals have moral independence from the bare wishes of 
government.   
 
WHY LOOK TO PUNISHMENT? 
 There is an obvious hazard involved in using sentencing and 
punishment as the terrain on which to explore an argument for accepting 
judicial displays of religious affiliation.  To raise the issue will lead some 
to imagine judges reasoning from religious authority or justifying 
sentencing decisions on the basis of religious text or precept.  James 
Whitman has touched on the way in which the peculiar version of (non-
)separationism found in the United States—one in which religious 
institutions and public institutions are meant to be insulated from one 
another, but talk of religion circulates freely in political and legal 
discourse—has resulted in distressing examples of biblically grounded 
claims for greater punishment being made in US courtrooms.18  Of course 
																																																								
18 James Q Whitman, ‘Separating Church and State: The Atlantic Divide’ (2008) 34 
Historical Reflections 86.  On the use of religion in sentencing in the United States, see 
also Mark Greenlee, ‘Faith on the Bench: The Role of Religious Belief in the Criminal 
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there would be much to worry about if this simplistic insertion of religion 
into the world of judicial punishment were the direction or thrust of my 
argument.  But I am not offering an argument for judicial reasoning from 
biblical mandate, nor for the suppression of the distinctive judicial task—
that of reasoning through and with publicly generated legal norms—in 
favour of religious moralising.  I am neither sanguine in the face of the 
risks of injecting religion into the judicial task, nor am I complacent about 
the importance of the judicial discipline of public reasoning.  In that 
sense, although I am questioning the political desirability of building too 
tall a wall between the character of judicial authority and the religious 
identity of judges, I am not squarely joining the debate about the 
character and content of judicial reasons in some form of rejoinder to 
Rawls.19  Rather, the inquiry here is into how else the appearance of 
religion as an aspect of a judge’s identity and belonging, which so 
troubled Bouchard and Taylor and vexes many others, might be 
differently coded.  How else might we read it? 
 Why, then, select the fraught area of punishment and sentencing—
the archetypal case of state coercion—as the basis for exploring these 
ideas about judicial authority and religious identity?  Of course the 
answer is, in part, linked to the story told in the introduction: it was the 
prospect of punishment and coercion of the accused that led Bouchard 
and Taylor to distinguish the case of judges (as well as police and 
correctional officers) from other public officials, who they felt should be 
permitted to display religious affiliations.  Punishment played, in this 
way, the key role in creating an otherwise unlikely convergence between 
these two significant recent policy statements on religious 
accommodation in Quebec.   
																																																																																																																																																					
Zgonjanin, ‘Quoting the Bible: The Use of Religious References in Judicial Decisions’ 
(2005) 9 New York City Law Review 31. 
19 For this kind of discussion of appeals to religion in light of the character of public 
reasoning see, eg, Mark C Modak-Truran, ‘Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law and 
the Relationship Between Law and Religion’ (1997) 26 Capital University Law Review 461; 
Michael J Perry, Religion in Politics: Constitutional and Moral Perspectives (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1997); Scott C Idleman, ‘The Limits of Religious Values in 
Judicial Decisionmaking’ (1998) 81 Marquand Law Review 537.  The frame for this debate 
is, of course, very much set by John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997) 
64 University of Chicago Law Review 765; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Religion in the Public 
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 Yet punishment offers a uniquely valuable sightline into the 
judicial role in Canada for reasons that have to do with the process and 
nature of sentencing.  For most of Canadian criminal law history, 
criminal punishment was essentially unguided by legislation, with no 
statements in the Criminal Code of the purposes and principles of 
sentencing.20  Choice of punishment was a quintessential example of 
judicial discretion, with judges left to generate their own theories and 
objectives of sentencing.  This fundamentally discretionary approach was 
subject to forceful critique, with concerns voiced about consistence, 
predictability, and transparency.  In the mid-1990s, Parliament sought to 
respond with a wholesale revision to the sentencing provisions of the 
Criminal Code.  And yet the 1995 amendments did little to alter the 
essentially discretionary character of sentencing in Canada.  Parliament 
offered a veritable buffet of sentencing objectives, ranging from 
deterrence and denunciation to rehabilitation and the cultivation of 
responsibility, with no indication as to which objective a judge ought to 
select and when, nor of the relative weighting or priority of these 
objectives.21  The sentencing principles remain broad and woolly, leaving 
intact the substantial margin for manoeuvre available to the sentencing 
judge.  Indeed, the legislation’s newly formulated ‘fundamental purpose 
of sentencing’ underscored the deeply normative and evaluative 
character of the sentencing enterprise.  Section 718 explained that this 
fundamental purpose ‘is to contribute, along with crime prevention 
initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful 
and safe society by imposing just sanctions’,22 sanctions that pursue one 
or more of the listed objectives.  Although precedent and some legislative 
minima and restrictions shape the judge’s range of options, the moment 
of punishment invites the judge to make broad judgments not just about 
the facts of a case and the character of an act, but about a ‘just society’ 
and the character of an offender’s circumstances and life’s story.   
																																																								
20 For an excellent brief history of sentencing in Canada, see Allan Manson, The Law of 
Sentencing (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2001) 14–29.  
21 Parliament has since offered some limited guidance in this respect, indicating in ss 
718.01, 718.02, and 718.03 that primary consideration should be given to the objectives 
of deterrence and denunciation in cases of offences against children, and certain 
offences committed against peace officers, law enforcement, and other participants in 
the justice system.  See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 718.01, 718.02, 718.03. 
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 The result is that in the act of sentencing we find one of the most 
forceful and violent expressions of the authority of the state matched 
with a high degree of discretion afforded to the decision-maker.  How to 
realise the fundamental objectives of sentencing; how to respond well, 
and in an individualised way, to the person that has found their way 
before the court; how to balance the competing interests involved in the 
moment of sentencing: the nature of the system is that these are matters 
of ineradicable and deep indeterminacy to which we accept that judges 
bring certain kinds of personal instincts, perspectives, and experiences.  
Without much by way of rule-based buffer, the whole person of the judge 
is drawn into an encounter with the person, responsibility, and deeds of 
the offender.  Comforting ideas that the judge is simply a speaker of state 
law wither in the sentencing environment.  Another way of putting this 
is that there is, in sentencing and punishment decisions, no plausible 
retreat to the conceits of legal formalism.  Sentencing is one place where 
it is very difficult not to accept that who the judge is—the content of her 
conscience and philosophy of crime and punishment—matters deeply.  
In the moment of punishment, the clearest and most potent moment of 
the exercise of the raw will and coercive force of the state meets the 
principled but wide-ranging discretion of the sentencing judge.  It is this 
very confluence that points, I will suggest, to why markers of religious 
and normative pluralism in a judiciary should be welcomed, not 
prohibited, or even merely tolerated.   
 
A HISTORICAL EXCURSION 
 The demand for proof beyond reasonable doubt is one of the 
pillars of contemporary criminal law.  It stands as an emblem of the 
modern, enlightened administration of criminal justice and, within that 
realm, serves as a virtual synecdoche for the rule of law.  Its relationship 
to the rule of law flows from the imagined position that it occupies in the 
criminal process.  It is thought that this standard of proof stands between 
the fearful and potentially tyrannical power of the state and the liberty of 
the subject, serving as a protective principle that ensures that the morally 
innocent are not improperly swept up in the machinery of state 
punishment.  As we understand it today, then, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a much-cherished but rather simple principle—a 
feature of modern law that serves to protect the accused from wrongful 
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 As it turns out, the history is far more complex and interesting.  
This complicated history points to a very different function for the idea of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it is a history that ties together religion, 
state authority, and punishment in provocative ways.  In this section, I 
turn to this history as a means of excavating resources for thinking 
differently about the place that religious adherence might occupy in our 
picture of criminal judgment.   
 At the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, Pope Innocent III 
prohibited the clergy from participating in trial by ordeal.  This edict 
effectively abolished the principal means of criminal trial in England, but 
it also released a flood of anxiety into the criminal justice system.  To be 
sure, trial by ordeal had been a terrible event for the accused.  Whether 
by hot iron, cold water, or (for the higher-status accused) battle, trial by 
ordeal must have been a fearful process, all the more so in light of the 
mortal consequences of a finding of guilt.  And yet it posed little concern 
or anxiety for those involved in administering criminal law.  The logic of 
ordeal was straightforward enough: in the epistemology of the time, the 
ordeal offered a direct point of access to God’s judgment as to the guilt of 
the accused.  Concerned with the taint of blood for the clergy who 
oversaw these ordeals, when Pope Innocent III banned clergy 
participation, matters shifted entirely.  Now that direct judgment from 
God could not be secured, criminal judgment would have to be a human 
matter.  As James Whitman shows in The Origins of Reasonable Doubt,23 
this shift in responsibility after the ordeal generated deep moral anxiety, 
an anxiety that would be crucial to the development of the contemporary 
criminal trial. 
 Whitman explains that the act of human judgment—suddenly 
necessary in a post-ordeal world—was understood to be a deeply 
perilous and risky business.  ‘Early modern Christians’, Whitman writes, 
‘experienced great anxiety about the dangers that acts of judgment 
presented for the soul’ because ‘any sinful misstep committed by a judge 
in the course of judging “built him a mansion in Hell”’.24  Phrases such as 
‘judge not lest ye be judged’, and ‘they that take up the sword shall 
perish by the sword’ rang in the ears of those responsible for judgment 
with a resonance and force that it is difficult to imagine today.  In the 
																																																								
23 James Q Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal 
Trial (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008). 
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case of criminal judgments, with the mortal and bloody consequences so 
often associated with conviction, the peril was particularly acute because, 
in the theological atmosphere of the time, the individual who judged 
wrongly was responsible for and polluted by this bloodshed, wielding 
the sword just as the soldier did.  The stakes were high, then, not only for 
the accused but also for the judge, whose soul was at stake in each act of 
criminal judgment.   
When the ordeals ended in 1215, the need to judge collided with a 
complex theology of doubt that had generated out of this anxiety around 
human judgment.  A doctrine called the ‘safer path’ had developed in 
moral theology, and instructed that ‘in cases of doubt, “in dubiis,” one 
should act in such a way as to minimize the possibility of pollution’.25  
Trepidation about pronouncing judgment in the presence of doubt was 
deep.  Without the moral comfort of the ordeals, other means would have 
to be found to manage this anxiety about judgment, and many of those 
techniques were the progenitors to the characteristic features of our 
modern criminal trial.  The jury itself, Whitman explains, was one such 
device for the moral comfort of judges, shifting moral peril from judges 
to lay jurors who were placed under ‘exceptional moral pressure’.26  
Jurors, no less aware of the ‘safer path’ than judges, were reticent to 
convict in the presence of any uncertainty.  Over the course of the 
thirteenth to seventeenth centuries, however, techniques of 
responsibility-shifting (including the special verdict and benefit of clergy) 
and jury control (including, in the seventeenth century, fining and even 
imprisoning jurors) allowed the system to extract convictions from juries.  
However, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries these 
practices fell into disrepute.  Benefit of clergy withered and jury control 
was abolished.  And with this, jurors fell back on the safer path, reluctant 
to convict. 
Moral theology responded to the risk that this posed to the 
administration of justice, and its response was the doctrine of reasonable 
doubt.  Yes, it was a grave matter—a matter that implicated one’s soul—
to judge another when one had doubt.  But this did not mean, this 
doctrine held, that you had to be concerned with any doubt whatsoever.  
No, your soul was safe, theologians explained, as long as you harboured 
																																																								
25 ibid 117. 
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no reasonable doubt.  The origins of reasonable doubt were, thus, as a 
means to encourage conviction, not to discourage it.  It was a device of 
moral comfort, not one aimed at factual proof.  Whitman summarises the 
provocative conclusion as follows: 
the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard was not originally 
designed to make it more difficult for jurors to convict.  It was 
designed to make conviction easier, by assuring jurors that their 
souls were safe if they voted to condemn the accused.  In its 
original form, it had nothing to do with maintaining the rule of law 
in the sense that we use the phrase, and nothing like the 
relationship to the values of liberty we ascribe to it today.  It was 
the product of a world troubled by moral anxieties that no longer 
trouble us much at all.27 
 The principal contemporary lesson that Whitman draws from this 
history of reasonable doubt is that, with the loss of this pervasive 
Christian moral frame, modern law has become comfortable—perhaps 
too comfortable—with judging.  Indeed, he argues that ‘[o]ne of the 
features that makes our law modern is our lack of anxiety about judging 
others.’28  The historical fear around judgment was an artefact of the 
saturation of the public and private lives of the judge and juror alike with 
the worldview and absolute authority of Christian moral theology.  
‘Modern secularization has brought the decline of the fearful religiosity 
of the past.’29  Most people—including judges and jurors—no longer 
move in their lives trembling with fear for the eternal fate of their souls.  
In many respects, release from this kind of day-to-day fear is a good 
thing: ‘humans who no longer quake and tremble are humans who live 
richer lives in many ways.’30  And yet that fear and anxiety in criminal 
adjudication served a function: it helped to restrain the violent hand of 
the criminal law.  Be it in the development of demanding burdens and 
standards of proof or in the creation of procedural rules such as jury 
unanimity, this sense of moral discomfort in the exercise of criminal 
judgment tended historically to translate into a kind of parsimony in the 
																																																								
27 ibid 5. 
28 ibid 6. 
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use of the criminal law.  Whitman concludes, harrowingly, that ‘[t]he 
larger truth is that we have slowly been losing the capacity to gaze into 
our own breasts and ask ourselves hard questions about when and how 
we have the right to punish others’.31  
 It would be a mistake to fall into nostalgia for this period in the 
criminal trial or to become Pollyannaish about the historical influence of 
Christianity on the uses to which criminal law and trial processes have 
been put.  Yet there is significant value in the specific lesson that, in the 
presence of uncertainty, a due measure of anxiety about judgment is a 
salutatory thing.  And this lesson, along with the details of the historical 
excursion that teaches it, points to something of structural interest for the 
purposes of this chapter.  The story of the origins of reasonable doubt 
offers an example of how the meeting of religious conscience and the 
barest form of coercive power generated attitudes of restraint and 
scepticism about the uses of state power.  When the seventeenth-century 
juror gazed into his breast, he found a source of authority in Christian 
moral theology that offered an important counterpoint to the raw 
coercive authority of the state.  The salutary anxiety that Whitman 
identifies was produced because state punishment had to pass through 
the person of a judge/juror whose normative reference points could not 
be readily assimilated to law enforcement interests or kingly authority 
alone.  This moral independence of the juror from the government was 
disciplined and controlled for centuries through mechanisms of jury 
control and responsibility-shifting; the story of reasonable doubt is the 
story of finding a way to assuage that anxiety in service of more efficient 
and reliable punishment.  Yet it remains true that Christian theology was 
a force to contend with in the development of modern criminal law, 
forceful because it offered an alternative footing on which to stand in 
judgment of the rightness of an act of punishment.    
One might feel as though this digression into legal history has 
taken us far afield from this chapter’s questions about judges, religious 
symbols, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, and the ‘Charter of Quebec 
Values’.  It is, however, just this structural observation—an observation 
about the importance of moral independence in the act of judgment—
that offers the key to an alternative reading of religious symbols and the 
judicial role, a reading that might in fact have particular salience and 
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READING RELIGION AND THE JUDGE 
 Equipped with this account from the history of the common law 
criminal trial, I return to the matter at hand: how to read the appearance 
of religious symbols on the person of a judge.  The Bouchard-Taylor 
report reflected the instinct that there was something about the capacity 
to exercise state coercion—what the commissioners called ‘the power of 
punishment’32—that made the case for ‘circumspection’ particularly 
strong.  Consider the heart of Bouchard and Taylor’s argument leading to 
their suggested prohibition on judges wearing items that would mark 
religious belonging:  
Everyone will agree that this type of situation must be broached 
with the utmost caution.  The case of judges is probably the most 
complex and the hardest to decide upon.  It is essential that the 
parties involved in a trial, especially the respondent, who may be 
punished, can assume the judge’s impartiality.  Could a Muslim 
respondent assume the impartiality of a Jewish judge wearing a 
kippah or a Hindu judge displaying a tilak?33 
The next line of the report makes the assertion that ‘[t]he right to a fair 
trial is one of the acknowledged basic legal rights of all citizens.’34 
 Notice how this reading of the religious symbol proceeds: the 
symbol of religious belonging is implicated in issues of impartiality and 
fair trial rights.  The symbol worn by one of these imagined judges is 
evidence of religious particularity, and this particularity translates into 
the possible apprehension of partiality.  The protection of the fair trial 
rights of the accused thus requires that we ensure that there is no 
evidence that the judge is compromised by religious particularity.  And 
yet with the historical excursion in hand, I think that we might imagine a 
very different reading of the marker of the judge’s religious belonging, 
one that flips the argumentative valence of the moment of punishment or 
coercion. 
																																																								
32 Bouchard and Taylor (n 8) 151. 
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 Rather than tethering the religious symbol to concerns about 
impartiality (understood here as dependent on non-particularlity), one 
might choose to focus instead on the basal judicial norm of 
independence.  Judicial independence is amongst the most fervently 
invoked and jealously guarded principles in the structure of our justice 
system.  It is a commitment protected both by explicit right and by 
implication in the Canadian constitution.35  Notably, most discussion of 
and jurisprudence about judicial independence focuses on the 
institutional paraphernalia of independence: security of tenure, 
protections around remuneration, and such.  And yet the under-
discussed heart of the principle is independence of mind: a kind of 
conscientious or moral independence.  This is what the accused desires at 
the moment of judgment or punishment.  The accused’s chief interest is 
not in an abstract philosophical impartiality, but rather impartiality as 
between the accused and his antagonist, the prosecuting authorities.  The 
central hope is for a judge that is independent from the interests or raw 
will of the government.  This is the foundation of the fair trial right.  And 
if this idea of moral independence is brought into focus, the particularity 
of the religious symbol might designate something quite different and 
salutary: a marker for the existence of evaluative footings that are not 
reducible to the prevailing governance interests of the executive.   
 Both the structural logic and the practical realities of rights 
protection in the criminal justice system turn on the existence of a buffer, 
in the person of the judge, between law enforcement authorities and the 
subject.  It is precisely at the moment of coercion—where there exists the 
power of punishment—that a distance between government and judge is 
most imperative.  It is at this moment that the hope is most ardent that 
the authority and interests of government will not be the sole perspective 
from which power is exercised.  And it is therefore at this moment that 
we might actually have the greatest appetite for the showing of religious 
particularity within our judiciary.  The appearance of religious symbols 
amongst members of the judiciary can be read (and should be 
encouraged to be read) as a reminder that judges cannot be neatly 
assimilated into the apparatus of the government, functioning solely as 
agents of its will and authority.  These symbols could be viewed as 
reminders of how important it is that judges have the moral 
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independence that comes with evaluative footings that cannot be tidily 
identified with the perspectives of the legislature or executive.  
 Consider the historical case of the origins of reasonable doubt.  In 
that story the religious conscience of adjudicators did not serve to 
aggravate punishment; the rule of law did not admit of that kind of 
effect.  Rather, religion introduced a ground for scepticism and caution in 
the exercise of state authority through the imposition of state violence.  
Christianity offered resources that created a counterpoint to ideals of 
efficient and confident punishment.  Ultimately, those cautionary 
principles had to find expression in the law, giving rise, as Whitman 
explains, to a number of the central features of our contemporary 
criminal trial.  But the religious particularity of the judges and jurors 
served as an avenue through which these decision-makers achieved 
critical distance from the pure will of state authority, testing the will to 
punish against norms of justice and fairness that were not endogenous to 
the prevailing logic of government.  That history is a rather potent 
expression of the idea of judicial independence and its value to a justice 
system.  
Of course, there is nothing to assure us that the religious 
conviction that opens up this distance will always counsel a posture of 
mercy or mitigation.  The moral independence that is signalled by 
symbols of religious belonging could instil an appetite to punish, or as a 
matter of outcome in a given case, align the judge with the interests and 
power of the government, rather than inducing scepticism about the use 
of criminal law.  Although the historical example of the development of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a story about religion as a force for 
parsimony and restraint, it would be a mistake to imagine that religious 
belief will consistently induce that salutary attitude.  Yet in this respect 
we are in no different a position than we would find ourselves with a 
religiously committed judge whose religion does not involve symbolic 
displays, or with a judge inspired by otherwise-sourced political or 
philosophical commitments.  Moreover, at a historical moment in which 
prevailing interpretations of the mixing of religious identity and public 
authority are so often negatively charged, we do well to meditate on 
examples of the goods—including a scepticism about state power in the 
context of criminal punishment—that religious commitment can bring.  
But what is ultimately appealing about the appearance of religious 
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what is structurally communicated: the independence of the judge who is 
tasked with sitting in review of exercises of state power. 
 Read within these terms, consider the picture of the judiciary that 
is invited by the prohibition on religious symbols suggested in the 
Bouchard-Taylor Commission and the proposed ‘Charter of Secularism’.  
That ban on religious symbols is not, of course a ban on symbols 
associated with the judiciary and the act of punishment.  Symbols 
abound in that setting, but they are all the symbols of state authority.  
The coat of arms, the flag, the uniforms of public office, the ‘Crown’, ‘Her 
Majesty’, the trappings of government buildings—everything that an 
accused meets through the process of state coercion is an expression of 
state authority and power.  Stripped of markers of her own particularity, 
there is little to obviously distinguish the person of the judge from the 
machinery of punishment.  The authority of the government and the 
ends of justice are too neatly aligned when all symbols and language 
within a justice system are those endogenous to law itself.  We have 
never allowed the authority of law and the ends of justice to be collapsed 
in this way.  Throughout our legal history, equity has been a structural 
space for the exercise of conscience that is not reducible to law alone.  
And through the royal prerogative of mercy, prosecutorial discretion, 
and the power of jury nullification, the criminal justice system has 
continued to depend on, cultivate, and protect ways in which justice 
requires that law be supplemented with assessments and evaluation from 
other grounds of moral and ethical judgment.36  Manifestations of 
cultural and personal particularity (of which religious symbols are one 
example) could serve as a welcome reminder that, amongst those 
through whom the coercive force of the state must pass, there exist 
footings for just this kind of sceptical posture.37  Viewed in this way, 
contemporary religious pluralism affords us a symbolic cache for 
																																																								
36 See Benjamin L Berger, ‘The Abiding Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against 
the Law and the Modern Constitutional Imagination’ (2011) 61 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 579. 
37 For a defence of religious norms as amongst the external norms that judges, of 
necessity, must draw in reasoning about justice, see Mark C Modak-Truran, 
‘Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision Making’ (2004) 53 
Catholic University Law Review 709.  See also Stephen L Carter, ‘The Religiously Devout 
Judge’ (1989) 64 Notre Dame Law Review 932.  For an influential critique of this position 
see Kent Greenwalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (New York, Oxford 
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markers of this kind of moral independence, so central to the task of 
judging. 
 One might object that this argument suggests that we can expect 
greater independence or impartiality from judges who wear items that 
mark their religious belonging.  To be clear, my argument is not that the 
sceptical position that I have described is somehow only possible 
perceivable where religion is brought into the courtroom.  My interest is 
not with whether a particular judge does or does not wear a religious 
symbol.  Instead, what should be attractive to us is the appearance of 
various moral touchstones and resources in the aggregate picture of the 
judiciary, because this helps to mark the judiciary as a collegium of 
ethical reasoners who enjoy moral independence from the claims of 
government authority alone.  Each judge benefits from the presence of 
others who manifest this particularity.  The existence of a turbaned judge 
down the hall who is deciding a bail matter benefits the many others who 
wear no such symbols of religious belonging.  It benefits them by 
association, if you will.  Having, in the aggregate, a judiciary that 
represents a range of moral and ethical resources that may play a role 
within the legal discipline of hearing, arguing, reason-giving, appealing, 
and dissenting, reminds and comforts the public that this is not a branch 
that is just about the technocratic execution of legislative or executive 
will.  With the presence of these symbols in our composite picture of the 
judiciary, we are reminded of the many forms and sources—some visibly 
marked, some not—of the sceptical, independent ground that we hope 
our judges will occupy.  Judges are still, of course, bound to the defining 
practice of reason-giving through and within the law.  We insist, 
throughout, that whatever scepticism one has can fit within and be 
articulated through public legal norms.  And yet, though part of the state 
apparatus, they are not reducible to servants of government authority or 
command. 
 It seems to me that, contrary to the argument advanced by 
Bouchard and Taylor, this matters most in light of the power of 
punishment and aware of the risks of state coercion.  Should the 
prevailing attitudes of the government and its exercises of state authority 
become unjust or excessive, a judiciary equipped with moral resources 
drawn from other perspectives seems a salutary thing, indeed.  Might we 
adopt this reading of the appearance of religious symbols in the judicial 
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evidencing a public role as decision-makers whose resources for critiques 
of state power are rich and various? 
 
CONCLUSION: COLIN WESTMAN AND MICHEL FOUCAULT 
 Over many years, Prime Minister Harper’s Conservative 
government has marched a path of ‘tough on crime’ reform to Canadian 
criminal law.  Central to that project was the revision of key elements of 
the sentencing regime, all of which restricted the freedom with which 
judges can craft sentences in pursuit of Parliament’s putative will that the 
primary principle of sentencing be that of proportionality.38  The Harper 
government has introduced a spate of new mandatory minimum 
sentences, extinguished the use of conditional sentences for most 
offences, limited the credit available for pre-trial detention, and imposed 
higher victim fine surcharges.  Although judges have responded to 
defence arguments on each of these points, and some of these matters 
have come before the Supreme Court of Canada,39 it is the latter 
example—that of the new mandatory victim surcharges—that produced 
the most widespread and open conflict between the judiciary and the 
government.  Judges across the country took up legal arms against this 
fee, some giving offenders decades to pay the fee, others ruling the 
surcharge unconstitutional, and some simply refusing to order the fine.40   
 Out of this controversy, Justice Colin Westman emerged as 
something of the public face of judicial resistance to the tough on crime 
agenda.  He earned notoriety for taking a very public and strident stance 
against the surcharge, voicing his concerns through the media—an 
unconventional and controversial move for a sitting judge.  Justice 
Westman, who took measures in court to evade the surcharge, 
denounced the government’s measures, calling the surcharge a ‘tax on 
																																																								
38 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 718.1. 
39 For a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada declaring certain mandatory 
minimum sentences unconstitutional, see R v Nur 2015 SCC 15.  
40 See Sean Fine, ‘Judges Defy Order to Impose Tories’ Victim-Services Surcharge’ The 
Globe and Mail (Toronto, 9 December 2013) 
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Justice David Paciocco ruled that s 737 of the Criminal Code, which provides for the 
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“broken souls”’.41  Drawing attention to the poverty, mental illness, and 
dislocation that so many of those who come before him suffer, and 
voicing his dismay at the prospect of fining these people, Justice 
Westman explained his actions – both in the courtroom and in the media 
– as follows:  
Those people in the soup kitchens I see in the courtroom, they 
don’t have a voice.  I think I have an obligation to them.  These are 
my brothers and sisters, from a theological perspective.42 
Quoting these words, Sean Fine, the justice reporter for the Globe and Mail 
notes: ‘Justice Westman wears a Christian cross under his judicial 
vestments.’43 
 The theological language used by Justice Westman, and the cross 
sitting under his gowns, no doubt irritate some, or even appear 
unseemly.  Justice Westman certainly received substantial criticism for 
his engagement with the media and for his judicial approach to the 
surcharge.  Of Westman’s conduct, Professor Adam Dodek is quoted as 
commenting, ‘Judges cannot pick and choose which laws they like and 
which they do not.  This undermines the rule of law and public 
confidence in the administration of justice’.44  Yet without necessarily 
defending Justice Westman’s conduct, one can cull a more interesting 
and subtle lesson from this set of events, one that arguably shows a 
thinness in this sense of the rule of law and what might feed public 
confidence in the judiciary.  In this case, Justice Westman’s religious 
convictions, hidden though they were to those appearing before him, 
served as a lever for wedging space between the technocratic execution 
of the will of the government and the act of just punishment.   
  In his lectures on ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’, Foucault noted that 
one feature of the rise of neoliberalism was the ‘anthropological erasure 
of the criminal’.45  Over the course of the nineteenth century, there had 
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been a tendency to understand crime in a way that involved the 
‘psychological, sociological, and anthropological problematization of the 
person on whom the law is applied’.46  Foucault explains that with 
neoliberalism, this anthropological and individualised criminal—this 
homo criminalis—was replaced by homo economicus.  As the market became 
the authoritative index of all legitimate government action, and human 
action was thus best interpreted through that grid of intelligibility, crime 
became just another form of economic action, with the criminal ‘treated 
only as anyone whomsoever who invests in an action, expects a profit 
from it, and who accepts the risk of a loss’.47   
 The victim surcharge was a pristine expression of a neoliberal 
frame for understanding crime and the criminal.  Many Canadian judges 
have resisted this prevailing logic of criminal justice reform and have 
done so without manifest recourse to religious commitments; and 
whatever their posture, all judges have worked within and through the 
law.  And yet for Justice Westman, theology was a means of 
reintroducing an anthropology of the criminal.  For this judge, religion 
was a resource to draw on to recomplicate the picture of crime and 
criminals painted by the government.  Judges, through judgments about 
punishment and sentencing, have always done that: they have met 
dominant narratives about justice, crime, and society, with inconvenient 
facts and complicating stories.  In a society characterised by deep 
religious pluralism, might it be that we should welcome evidence of the 
religious particularity of judges as enrichments of that quintessential role 
of the judge?  Perhaps we should re-read religious symbols as markers of 
the moral independence of the judiciary.   
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